This article examines the international factor underlying China's grand strategy of peaceful development, which can be deciphered as a strategy to balance American power through internal balancing and soft balancing. The strategy of internal balancing aims to increase China's relative power through economic development and military modernization, whereas the strategy of soft balancing attempts to limit US ability to impose its preference on China through Beijing's engagement in multilateral institutions, bilateral partnerships, and economic diplomacy. The strategic logic is to maintain a stable external environment for China to concentrate on economic growth and accumulate relative power -without provoking a vigorous US response.
China's foreign policy today appears non-confrontational yet proactive. Long gone is the revolutionary rhetoric of the Maoist era. Through the carefully crafted guideline of 'peaceful development' (heping fazhan), Beijing strives to reassure its neighbors of China's benign intentions and to present a kinder, gentler image to the world. Underlying this tactical shift is a well-thought-out strategy of fostering a peaceful international environment that is most conducive to developing China's national power. Beijing has adopted an activist diplomatic agenda as well as a goodneighbor policy. Membership in international organizations has soared and Chinese leaders travel frequently around the globe.
What explains China's strategy? Answering this question is important for understanding balance-of-power politics in the unipolar era. The United States is the world's only superpower. It now produces more than a quarter of the world's total economic output and accounts for nearly half of the world's total military expenditures. No other state in modern history has achieved such a preponderance of wealth, might, and influence. China, on the other hand, is a rising power with the potential to compete with the United States in international affairs. In a world in which America holds a preponderance of power, Beijing has proclaimed that it will unswervingly adhere to the path of peaceful development.
Some emphasize domestic factors in the explanation of China's peaceful development. In this view, Chinese foreign policy is a response to the domestic needs to modernize the country and build a relatively well-off (xiaokang) society. Economic growth will strengthen the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), while a faltering economy could generate massive unemployment as well as social unrest, threatening the CCP rule. But domestic considerations explain only a part of China's grand strategy. Beijing is also responding to international pressures and constraints (Lieberthal, 2007) . China is operating in a unipolar world. For Chinese leaders, the possibility of a US effort to obstruct China's rise must be taken into consideration; they must also address neighboring states' fear of rising Chinese power.
This article focuses on the international dimension that gives rise to the grand strategy of peaceful development. I argue that unipolarity has a profound impact on China's grand strategy. Operating under the constraints of American power, China is pursuing a strategy of peaceful development that combines elements of internal balancing and soft balancing. The strategic objective is to balance American power and shorten the power gap between the two countries. The strategy of internal balancing aims to increase China's relative power through economic development and military modernization, whereas the strategy of soft balancing aims to limit or frustrate US policy initiatives deemed detrimental to Chinese interests through Beijing's engagement in multilateral institutions, bilateral partnerships, and economic diplomacy. The strategic logic is to create and maintain a stable external environment that is most conducive to the accumulation of Chinese power without triggering US-led counterbalancing against China's rise.
Unipolarity and its Implications
At the Cold War's end, some analysts predicted that states would quickly form a balancing coalition against the United States. The 'unipolar moment' would be short-lived (Krauthammer, 1990/91; Layne, 1993; Waltz, 1994) . However, nearly two decades later, a balancing coalition has yet to emerge. This seems to present a problem for balance of power theory, which holds that states will balance against concentrations of power. To explain the absence of balancing, a widely cited argument suggests that the United States, as an offshore power enjoying the advantages of geography, is so far ahead of every other state in almost every dimension of power that coordinating a counterbalancing coalition would be extremely difficult and prohibitively costly. Given the huge power disparity, no state in its right mind would want to provoke the 'focused enmity' of the United States (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008; Wohlforth, 1999) .
Compared with bipolarity and multipolarity, the unipolar structure is relatively new to international relations and may present states with starkly different constraints and incentives, producing different state strategies and international outcomes (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008; Ikenberry, 2002; Ikenberry et al., 2009 ). Because of the unique power structure of unipolarity, states may choose different instruments of balancing not captured by the traditional conception of balancing. To remedy this inadequacy, scholars have begun to grapple with how states behave in a unipolar world. Most agree that second-tiered states rely on nonmilitary instruments of balancing rather than the traditional form of military alliances. 'Soft balancing', for instance, seeks to constrain the unipolar state through diplomatic action and international institutions (Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005; Walt, 2005) . 'Leash-slipping' involves second-tier states' acquisition of the capability to act independently of the unipolar state in order both to escape from the latter's leash-like grip on them and to preserve their autonomy and freedom of action in foreign policy (Layne, 2006) .
In general, states wishing to close the power gap with the stronger state can resort to either 'internal balancing' or 'external balancing', or they may do both (Waltz, 1978) . Internal balancing refers to the military, economic, and political efforts undertaken within a state aimed at increasing its capability in countering the threat posed by a more powerful rival. Internal balancing can take two forms. First, a state can embark upon a major military buildup by upgrading armaments and training military personnel. This type of internal balancing, however, is likely to arouse immediate security concerns among other states, who will likely fear that these military buildups may be used against them. Second, a state can accumulate potential power by prioritizing economic growth and developing cutting-edge science and technology. In contrast to massive military buildups, this type of internal balancing focusing on economic development is less likely to arouse immediate security concerns among other states because wealth is 'latent power', not military power (Brawley, 2004) . The accumulated wealth can be converted into military might at a more propitious time later. States can, of course, engage in both types of internal balancing, assigning different weight to military or economic capabilities and gradually adjusting the mix along the way. States can try to maneuver into a delicate balance between these two types of internal balancing in order to minimize fears among neighboring states.
External balancing through military alliance, however, is not a viable option in a unipolar world. As noted above, forming a military alliance against the United States is extremely difficult because of the coordination problem and the constraints of geography. Although traditional 'hard' balancing is difficult, second-tier states can employ diplomatic measures to constrain the unipole and to preserve their political autonomy. Known as 'soft balancing', these measures are 'actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies' (Pape, 2005) . Second-tier states can coordinate their foreign policy to obtain outcomes contrary to US preferences and limit the ability of the United States to impose its preferences on them (Walt, 2005) . This is done primarily through multilateral institutions, bilateral partnership, and economic diplomacy. In multilateral institutions, second-tier states can build a coalition with others sharing similar concerns over the unbridled exercise of American power and work together to deny or undermine US policy initiatives. States can also become actively involved in the existing institutions or create a new one that excludes the unipolar state. Multilateral institutions aside, states can build bilateral partnerships that provide a framework to strengthen mutual ties at the expense of the unipolar state. Alternatively, states can build 'regional trading blocs' or similar economic arrangements that enhance their latent power through trade and economic growth, and even take measures to exclude the unipolar state (Pape, 2005) . Table 1 shows a snapshot of US-China power gap in 2007. Though a crude measure, the United States apparently enjoys a substantial lead in economic output and military spending. The massive concentration of power in the United States implies that China (and other states) has strong incentives to stay out of Washington's strategic spotlight and to concentrate on internal efforts to strengthen China's power base. A stable external environment would give China the much needed time to catch up with the United States. The challenge for Beijing is to devise a grand strategy that can achieve three objectives: (1) shortening the US-China power gap; (2) limiting the ability of the United States to constrain China's rise; and (3) ameliorating international fear of rising Chinese power. The strategy of 'peaceful development' promises to accomplish these three objectives.
China's grand strategy of peaceful development can be deciphered as a strategy of internal balancing and soft balancing. The strategy of internal balancing entails accelerated economic growth and military modernization that emphasizes asymmetric capabilities, whereas the strategy of soft balancing calls for joining, and even creating, multilateral institutions, forging bilateral partnerships, and engaging in economic diplomacy. The internal balancing strategy is designed to increase China's relative power and shrink the power gap with the United States, whereas the soft balancing strategy aims to constrain US hegemonic behavior through diplomatic efforts. An outright hard balancing effort would likely provoke an active US response (such as containment), which would not serve China's interests. Adopting a strategy of peaceful development could also ameliorate international concerns about China's rising power and discredit the 'China threat theory' (Deng, 2006) .
Internal Balancing
The first pillar of China's grand strategy of peaceful development is internal balancing. Because hard, external balancing is difficult in a unipolar world, the primary means that Beijing is employing to close the power gap with the United States is through internal efforts to increase China's capabilities. As Robert Ross (2004: 288) points out, 'Beijing is relying primarily on domestic resources to balance U.S. power'. Whether China will be able to rise to the rank of world great power and become the leading state in Asia will ultimately depend on its economic wealth, technological prowess, and military might. Accordingly, Beijing is setting economic development as its principal task, meanwhile embarking upon a military modernization program with an emphasis on asymmetric capabilities that is designed to enable it to prevail, or to hold its own, in the event of conflict with the US. This well-calibrated strategy seeks to find an optimal balance between 'guns' and 'butter'. As the 2008 China Defense White Paper makes clear, by coordinating economic development and national defense, Beijing 'strikes a balance between enriching the country and strengthening the military' (Information Office of the State Council, 2009: 9).
The Primacy of Economic Development
Economic growth is Beijing's priority. In a crucial talk with leading members of the Central Committee in 1990, senior leader Deng Xiaoping (1993: 356) instructed: 'If China wants to withstand the pressure of hegemonism and power politics and to uphold the socialist system, it is crucial for us to achieve rapid economic growth and to carry out our development strategy'. The Chinese leadership has taken this dictum to heart, setting economic development as the primary goal of China's grand strategy. The logic is straightforward: To withstand the unipolar pressure in the international system, China must have power, which in turn rests on economic wealth.
The collapse of the Soviet Union offers a sobering lesson to Beijing about the adverse consequences of prioritizing the military and distorting economic structure -China should maintain an optimal balance between economic development and military modernization (Shen Jiru, 2001; Ye Zicheng, 2003) . Moreover, China's rise requires minimizing international concerns over its newfound capabilities and military posture in Asia. Assigning priority to economic issues is less likely to alert neighbors and attract counterbalancing efforts than embracing a Soviet-style military modernization that aims to surpass the armaments of the other superpower (Goldstein, 2005) . Consequently, Chinese leaders have been at pains to stress that China's rise presents tremendous economic opportunities, not military threats, to other states. In addition to power concerns, Beijing's strategy of peaceful development serves domestic needs as well. As Communism has lost appeal in China, making the country prosperous will earn legitimacy for the Communist Party and help it stay in power. The regime has taken credit for feeding 1.3 billion people and turning China from a backwater into an economic powerhouse, and frequently sets goals to continue and accelerate this growth. For instance, China's 11th Five-Year Plan, passed in 2005 by the National People's Congress, aims to double the nation's 2000 per capita GDP by 2010, and to have an overall GDP of $4 trillion (China's GDP easily surpassed the $4 trillion target in 2008). In addition to maintaining stable economic growth, Beijing must solve a host of domestic governance problems -rural poverty, the coastal-interior development gap, income inequality, the reform of state-owned enterprises, and corruption, to name just a few (Shirk, 2007) . This daunting task is not to be taken lightly. As Zheng Bijian (2005: 19) , the architect of the 'peaceful rise' theory, repeatedly emphasizes: 'China has a population of 1.3 billion. Any small difficulty in its economic or social development, spread over this vast group, could become a huge problem'. Hence, Beijing has every incentive to highlight the peaceful aspect of its foreign policy behaviors -it cannot afford an unstable international environment. By emphasizing economic development as well as the trade and investment opportunities it presents to the outside world, Beijing hopes to alleviate regional fears of China's rising power (Gill, 2005) .
Thanks to the emphasis on economic development, the economic gap between China and the US is rapidly shrinking. In 1979, the year Deng Xiaoping started the 'reform and opening up' policy, the size of the US economy was approximately 31.5 times that of China. In 2002, the size of the US economy ($9.22 trillion) was 7.6 times larger than China's ($1.21 trillion). The economic gap has continued to shrink. In 2007, the size of the US economy ($13.8 trillion) was only 4.2 times larger than that of China's ($3.28 trillion) (World Bank, various years). The gap is expected to shrink further if China sustains its current growth rate. By some measures, China has surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy.
The global financial crisis starting in 2008 catapulted the world economy into the most severe downturn since the Great Depression. The economic slowdown has caused a record plunge in Chinese exports, putting tens of millions of migrant workers out of jobs. The prospect of potential social unrest as a result of rising unemployment has unnerved Beijing. The Chinese government responded by rolling out an enormous 4 trillion-RMB ($586 billion) stimulus package in November 2008, most of which would be spent on infrastructure. Through the economic stimulus, Beijing hoped to increase the competitiveness of Chinese companies and boost domestic consumption. In the view of Chinese leaders, increased domestic consumption will be crucial to the long-term growth of the Chinese economy. Chinese leaders believed that a target of 8 percent GDP growth in 2009 would be required to shore up employment and tamp down social unrest. Such a target might be a tall order during global downturn, but it was indicative of Beijing's determination to keep economic development high on the agenda of China's grand strategy. As it turned out, China has successfully met the 8 percent growth target in 2009.
Military Modernization
China's military modernization fits into the concept of hard (internal) balancing, an area that has aroused the most concerns in the region. On 4 March 2009, China announced that its defense budget was 480.686 billion RMB ($70 billion), a 14.9 percent rise over the previous year (Xinhua, 2009) . Official defense expenditures have been on a double-digit increase every year since the end of the Cold War. A Pentagon analysis reveals that China's officially disclosed defense budget from the period of 1996 to 2008 grew at an average of 12.9 percent in real terms, outpacing the rate of GDP growth at 9.6 percent (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009: 31) . This analysis is consistent with the consensus among China watchers that the country's defense spending since the 1990s has increased at a rate that 'substantially exceeds' economic growth (Lieberthal, 2007: 34) . However, because of the PLA's lack of transparency, the number for actual defense spending is usually two to three times above the official figure, making China the third largest military spender in the world. These figures, however, should be interpreted with caution. Chinese defense expenditures, though rising, remain a fraction of the US defense budget, which stood at $515.4 billion in 2009. China's official defense budget accounts for about 1.4 percent of its GDP; when adjusted for extra-budgetary revenue allocated to the PLA, China spends roughly the same percentage of GDP as the US does on defense, which stands at about 3-5 percent (Goldstein, 2005; Shambaugh, 2002) . In contrast, the former Soviet Union spent as much as 20 percent of its GDP on defense. Chinese leaders recognize 'the danger of investing too much in military modernization too early in its own development process' (Lampton, 2008: 76) . An all-out effort to increase China's military capabilities would not only provoke a counterbalancing effort by neighbors but also risk distorting its economic structure, as the Soviet Union did.
Much of China's military buildup is geared toward balancing American power, particularly in a conflict over Taiwan. Such a balancing motive is evident in the PLA's acquisition of advanced air, naval, and missile capabilities to achieve local access denial. Beijing has intensified efforts to procure the military capabilities to deter Taiwan from declaring de jure independence and to counter US efforts to assist Taiwan should conflict erupt. The PLA has demonstrated capacity to interdict US satellite communications by successfully testing a direct ascent, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007. Chinese submarines and surface warships were able to maneuver in close proximity to US aircraft carriers without being detected. These advances could adversely affect US ability to respond rapidly in a Taiwan crisis (Swaine, 2008) .
The long-term effects of the PLA's increased capabilities, however, go beyond the Taiwan Strait. After all, military capabilities in the Taiwan theater can be reconfigured for other contingencies. In an interview in March 2005, General Wen Zongren, then-Political Commissar of the Academy of Military Science, laid out a strategic (not nationalistic) view of why China must acquire Taiwan: controlling the island will thwart foreign efforts to blockade China. '[T]o rise suddenly, China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future development' (quoted in Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005: 12) . Beijing has begun to place 'a greater emphasis on acquiring more ambitious power projection capabilities beyond Taiwan' (Swaine, 2008: 78) . The Chinese navy is developing capabilities to project power to protect China's increasingly global interests (Lee, 2008) .
The PLA's modernization will likely take a long time. To deal with American military forces in the short run and to compensate for China's technological gap, Chinese military experts have turned to asymmetric warfare (Lee, 2008) . Such a strategy seeks to develop innovative use of existing technologies and weapon systems in order to 'level the playing field' against a technologically superior opponent (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009: 16-17) . Elements of China's asymmetric warfare include counterspace systems, cyber-warfare against civilian and military networks, attacks on financial infrastructure, information operations, and Three Warfares (psychological, media, and legal). Through these innovative strategies and tactics, the PLA hopes to deliver the 'assassin's mace' (shashoujian) to paralyze the superior opponents. The goal of an asymmetric strategy is not to directly confront US global preponderance or to defeat the US, but 'to develop politically useful capabilities to punish American forces if they were to intervene in a conflict of great interest to China' (Christensen, 2001: 9) . According to the 2009 Pentagon's annual report to Congress on the PRC's military power, China's efforts to modernize its military have made 'considerable progress'. The PLA has strengthened capabilities in both deterrence and strategic strike, improved anti-access/area-denial capabilities, positioned itself to contest electromagnetic dominance in future campaigns, and shifted the military balance in the Taiwan Strait to Beijing's favor (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009: VII-VIII). The PLA Navy has reportedly doubled the number of long-distance submarine patrols in 2008 (Sainsbury and Stewart, 2009 ). Of late, Chinese military officials have publicly spoken about the possibility of acquiring aircraft carriers as well as greater power projection capabilities. Such increased assertiveness appears to correlate with China's rising power.
Soft Balancing
The second pillar of China's grand strategy is to maintain a peaceful international environment by soft balancing American power. Beijing views certain aspects of the US preponderance as menacing to Chinese security interests and harbors suspicion that the US is taking measures to constrain China's rise. Therefore, it is in Beijing's interest to build a coalition of friendly states to 'minimize Washington's ability to contain or constrain China in the region' (Medeiros, 2005-06: 154) . Importantly, such diplomatic coordination efforts must not appear to be outright balancing against the United States. Military alliances with the purpose of hard balancing would provoke a vigorous US response, whereas soft balancing by diplomatic coordination could frustrate American policy objectives detrimental to Chinese interests without drawing the 'focused enmity' of US preponderant power (Sutter, 2005: 291, 296 ). To soft balance American power, Beijing is engaging in multilateral institutions, building bilateral partnerships, and employing economic diplomacy. These three vehicles, along with some overlaps among them, constitute the 'external balancing' aspect of China's grand strategy.
Multilateral Institutions
Before the mid-1990s, Beijing viewed multilateral institutions with suspicion because it feared that other countries could use them to 'gang up on' China. Instead, Beijing preferred bilateral relationships, hoping that China's size would give it more leverage. By 1996, however, Beijing realized that multilateral diplomacy could help ameliorate concerns over China's rising power. Membership in international organizations would enable China to reshape their rules to better suit Chinese interests -Beijing had viewed most institutions as serving Western interests (Chu Shulong, 2001; Jiang Yi, 2003; Jin Xin, 2001 ). As Beijing became more confident of its power, it gradually saw the benefits of institutions as instruments of statecraft. Such an instrumental view of multilateral institutions is substantively different from socialized acceptance of supranational rules and norms (Goldstein, 2005; Johnston, 2008 ). Beijing's use of multilateral institutions is consistent with the view that 'international institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests' (Waltz, 2000: 21) .
More importantly, multilateral institutions provide a vehicle for China to soft-balance American power (He, 2008) . In the words of a noted Chinese foreign policy expert: 'To be clear, an important reason why China now increasingly values multilateral diplomacy is U.S. hegemonic behavior after the Cold War and its superpower position' (Wang Yizhou, 2003: 274) . The unbridled exercise of American power was a major cause of China's increased participation in multilateral institutions. Through participating, China would be able to voice its concerns in multilateral fora, prevent these institutions from simply reinforcing US interests, and 'help hasten the end of the unipolar era' (Goldstein, 2005: 127) .
The network of China's multilateral diplomacy has expanded significantly. In Southeast Asia, Beijing is developing relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as 'a counterweight to US power' (Hughes, 2005: 130) and to 'weaken U.S. hegemony in the unipolar system' (He, 2008: 47) . Starting in 1995, Beijing began to engage the Southeast Asian states, and actively shaped the evolution of the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and Korea) and ASEAN+1 (China) mechanisms. Beijing has participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on security affairs and has made a concerted effort to reassure ASEAN states that China's development presents significant economic opportunities -not threats -to the region. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, by refusing to allow the Chinese currency to depreciate and by providing economic assistance to distraught nations, Beijing reassured its Southeast Asian neighbors that a rising China could be a 'responsible great power' in the region. Moreover, Beijing was the first non-ASEAN state to sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which pledges non-aggression, and has pledged to establish a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. Beijing adopted the preferred positions of ASEAN states in the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. As a result of this good-neighbor policy, of all the great powers in the region, China has made the most inroads into Southeast Asia, an area that has begun to view China more favorably in the post-9/11 world (Ba, 2003) .
China also has taken the initiative in Central Asia, creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 to fight the 'three evils' of separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism. Comprising China, Russia, and the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the SCO represents Beijing's efforts to project its influence into the region, secure energy supplies, stem secessionist activities in China's Muslim region of Xinjiang, and 'not to let U.S. dominance in regional and world affairs remained unchecked' (Chung, 2004: 995) . The strengthening of the SCO's institutional apparatus reflects Beijing's desire to counter rising US influence in Central Asia after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Some analysts even consider the security cooperation in the SCO as an example of an alliance against the United States (Walt, 2009: 102) , although it may still be premature to judge. The US military presence in Central Asia, though ostensibly stationed there for counterterrorism purposes, has created strategic pressures on China's western frontier (Fu Mengzi, 2003) . In his visit to Iran in 2002, President Jiang Zemin publicly opposed the stationing of American troops in Central Asia. At a summit meeting in July 2005, the SCO issued a statement calling for a 'final timeline' for the withdrawal of US troops from its members. The SCO is considering enlarging its membership. Iran, whose nuclear ambitions have antagonized Washington, has expressed its desire to join the SCO and was made an observer (with Pakistan and India) in 2005.
Of all the multilateral institutions, the UN Security Council offers the most effective venue for China, a veto-holding permanent member, to constrain and limit US policies (Paul, 2005) . China collaborated with Russia in 1999 over the Kosovo Crisis to prevent UN approval for the US-led intervention and had been highly critical of the NATO-led Kosovo campaign. Similarly, in the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003, China joined France and others in the Security Council calling for protracted inspections rather than the use of force favored by Washington. Not surprisingly, China has advocated a greater role for the UN in future international affairs.
Bilateral Partnerships
In addition to multilateral institutions, China has continued to cultivate bilateral relationships in the form of 'partnerships'. Through the partnerships, Beijing seeks to maximize leverage by linking economic benefits with bilateral relations. The concept of partnership is open to potential allies and adversaries and does not necessarily assume cooperative outcomes. It recognizes national differences in culture, ideology, and interests and seeks to build a mechanism to manage the areas of potential conflicts. These partnerships 'enable China to address concerns about US preponderance without resorting to the more directly confrontational' approach to balance American power (Goldstein, 2005: 130-135) . Beijing has built numerous partnerships with other states, including Russia, the European Union (EU), the United States, Japan, India, and ASEAN, among others. Of these, the partnerships with Russia and EU have deep strategic roots.
Russia is the foremost example of this type of strategic partnership. It is the main supplier of China's arms -accounting for 85 percent of China's total arms imports since the early 1990s -and in the view of the Pentagon a 'significant enabler of China's military modernization' (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005: 23) . US military operations in the Balkans during the 1990s gave rise to common concerns in Beijing and Moscow about American interventionism in what is considered the internal affairs of states. Against this background, and in light of NATO expansion and the strengthening of US alliances in Asia, China and Russia moved to strengthen bilateral ties by forging a 'strategic cooperative partnership' in 1996.
Subsequent developments have driven Moscow and Beijing closer together. In 2000, US plans to build a missile defense system and to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty led Russia and China to issue a joint statement voicing their opposition to what were considered strategically destabilizing moves by Washington (Goldstein, 2005) . The two countries reaffirmed that the international strategic balance must be maintained (Zhao Huasheng, 2001) . The next year the SinoRussian partnership took another step forward with the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. Though not a military alliance like the 1950 Sino-Soviet Alliance, Article 9 of the treaty calls for immediate consultations in the event of threat. In a rebuke to Washington's bypassing of the UN in invading Iraq in 2003, both countries reiterated that the maintenance of world peace is the main responsibility of the UN Security Council, and jointly opposed the use of military force to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Further expanding their cooperation, in 2005 China and Russia conducted their first-ever joint military exercise, involving 10,000 air, land, and naval forces.
Also to limit US power, China is deepening its relations with the EU and is cultivating partnerships with France, Britain, and Germany. One Chinese analyst argues that the Sino-Russian partnership is not enough to constrain US power and to expedite the arrival of multipolarity -the key is to win over Europe (Ye Zicheng, 2000) . China now holds regular summit meetings with the EU, and each is now the other's largest trading partner. China has also conducted search-and-rescue exercises with French and British naval ships, and plans are underway for further military exchanges. The EU has been considering lifting the arms embargo that it imposed on China following the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square; removing the embargo could significantly enhance China's military capability and Washington has pressured the EU not to lift it. European nations are seeking ways to balance American power and to preserve the EU's political autonomy (Posen, 2006) . Some American analysts believe that the China-EU strategic partnership is largely the result of shared concerns over US power: 'Both China and Europe seek ways to constrain American power and hegemony, whether through the creation of a multipolar world or through multilateral institutional constraints on the United States' (Shambaugh, 2004: 246) .
Economic Diplomacy
Although balance of power is often framed in military terms, the concept of balancing does not exclude using economic means to constrain the dominant state (Brawley, 2004) . One of the soft balancing mechanisms identified by Robert Pape (2005: 37) is 'regional trading blocs that increase trade and economic growth for members while directing trade away from nonmembers. If the superior state can be excluded from the most important such blocs, its overall trade and growth rates may suffer over time'. China is now the largest trading partner of almost every state in East and Southeast Asia; before 2000, that role belonged to the United States. To reap political and economic benefits, Beijing has been promoting 'politically driven' free trade agreements (FTAs) with Southeast Asian states and others (Lieberthal, 2007) . Although still at an early stage, there are indications that China is attempting to form a regional trading bloc or lock up energy and natural resources in its economic competition with the United States. This economic component of China's soft balancing efforts is reflected in its proposal to build an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area. Beijing was aware that Washington saw it as a potential competitor and hoped that the FTA would stimulate domestic development and growth and firmly tie Southeast Asian economies to China. Under the FTA, China provides an alternative market to North America and Europe as well as growth opportunities for members. ASEAN members will enjoy reduced tariffs before the WTO rules take effect and its non-WTO members will receive most favored nation (MFN) benefits. The FTA will be the first regional trading bloc that China has signed on to: 'the FTA arrangement with ASEAN helps Beijing support its long-term interests in mitigating, if not countering, US influence in Asia' (Ba, 2003: 641) . The FTA will strengthen Sino-ASEAN trade and investment links and facilitate Beijing's efforts to secure the supplies of energy and raw materials from resource-rich Southeast Asia. Successful regional integration will also enhance the prospect of a multipolar world (Hughes, 2005; Kuik, 2005) .
Beijing is also strengthening ties with African countries and offering various forms of economic assistance. China's no-strings-attached economic assistance provides a sharply different alternative to that of the western countries and aid agencies, which sets stringent, often painful, conditions on aid recipients. Chinese investments and economic aids help develop the African economy; Africa's rich natural resources are important for the Chinese economy and a large number of African countries provide diplomatic support for Chinese interests in multilateral institutions such as the UN and its affiliates (Alden, 2007) . NATO's humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999 prompted Beijing to view Africa as a potential counterweight to what the Chinese leaders saw as a US-led disregard of sovereignty (Deng, 2008) . Beijing took the initiative in setting up regular ministerial-level meetings between China and the African states, promising debt relief and tariff exemption, and established the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000. In the wake of the US-led Iraq War, Premier Wen Jiabao noted in the 2003 opening speech of the Forum meeting in Ethiopia: 'The people of the world share the aspiration for peace, stability, and development. But hegemonism is raising its ugly head' (Xinhua, 2003) . China hosted a grandiose summit meeting in Beijing in 2006, under the auspices of China-Africa Cooperation Forum. As a testament to growing Chinese clout in Africa, leaders from 48 out of the continent's 53 three countries attended the conference.
China has become active in America's backyard -Latin America. Latin American votes at the UN and other international institutions can help China 'counterbalance US influence' (Li, 2007: 835) . China maintains military cooperation with Cuba and operates joint signal intelligence and electronic warfare facilities on the island. China has also established a presence in the Panama Canal, prompting a number of US Congressional and military leaders to express concerns about its potential impact on US interests in the strategic waterway (Teng, 2007) . Strategic considerations aside, Beijing looks to the region for a steady supply of energy resources, raw materials, and foodstuffs. China's trade with Latin America is increasing rapidly, making it the region's second largest trading partner after the United States. However, Chinese trade and investment in Latin America remain far behind those of the United States, less than 10 percent of the US total (Li, 2007; Teng, 2007) . Nonetheless, the gap is expected to shrink. In 2009, Beijing negotiated deals to double a development fund to Venezuela to $12 billion, lend $10 billion to Brazil's national oil company, and provide Argentina with $10 billion in Chinese currency to help pay for imports from China (Remero and Barrionuevo, 2009) .
Washington has taken note of China's growing influence in the international economy. In the 2006 National Security Strategy, the White House accuses Chinese leaders of 'expanding trade, but acting as if they can somehow "lock up" energy supplies around the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up -as if they can follow a mercantilism borrowed from a discredited era' (Bush, 2006: 41) . In Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, China is investing heavily in oil, natural gas, and raw resources and building up their infrastructure -without demanding domestic political reforms in the host countries. Beijing's dealings with Sudan, Zimbabwe, Iran, and Venezuela have been criticized by Washington.
In the midst of the global financial crisis, China plays a critical role in helping to reverse the downturn. China holds a massive $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, most of which are dollardenominated assets including US treasury securities. China's buying up of American debts had the effect of keeping the US interest rate low, which encouraged borrowing and excessive consumption in the United States. This in turn fueled China's export-led economic growth. As the World Bank's president Robert Zoellick and chief economist Justin Yifu Lin (Zoellick and Lin, 2009) observes, the root cause of the global payment imbalances is 'overconsumption in the United States and oversaving in China' and hence recovery must address this structural issue. The United States must boost savings while China must increase domestic consumption.
Thanks to its growing economic might, Beijing has become more assertive in proposing reforms of the global financial system, such as replacing the dollar as the international reserve currency with something akin to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund. In the G-20 London summit on the global financial crisis in April 2009, China pledged a $40 billion loan to the IMF. The massive state wealth Beijing has accumulated gave China leverage in shaping the future world economy (Burrows and Harris, 2009) .
Conclusion
Unipolarity has a profound impact on China's grand strategy. The unipolar structure of power suggests that directly confronting the United States would be too costly and counterproductive; China cannot afford to stand in Washington's strategic spotlight -at least not in the short run. Yet for its own security, Beijing must close the power gap with the United States and counter US global dominance, meanwhile minimizing international concerns over China's growing power. The strategy of peaceful development promises to achieve these strategic objectives. Concentrating on economic development and striving to maintain a peaceful international environment has the potential of accomplishing the dual purpose of increasing national power while minimizing international concerns. It is a calculated, rational response to the hard reality of unipolar power.
The strategy of peaceful development has the effect of balancing American power. However, China's declared defensive intentions and cooperative behaviors can change when its relative power improves. As Robert Ross points out:
If the United States gives China the opportunity to displace the US presence [in East Asia], it will grab it. The United States should be under no illusion that China will be content with the status quo should its relative power increase. (2005: 87) Hence, whether China is a status quo or revisionist power is beside the point. Intentions can change as capabilities rise. As China becomes more powerful, its security competition with the United States will likely intensify. The structural contradiction between the existing hegemon intent on maintaining the Asian balance of power and the rising power with the potential to dominate the region will become more evident decades down the road. Unipolarity will fade away. Properly managing the US-China security competition will be the most challenging task in the 21st century.
